Friction is the force that resists all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.
…
Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. It may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance.
Friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated technologies.
Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical impact.
While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is to fight effectively despite the existence of friction.
One essential means to overcome friction is the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit.
Page 5#friction
…is precisely those actions that seem improbable that often have the greatest impact on the outcome of war.
Because we can never eliminate uncertainty, we must lear to fight effectively despite it. We can do this by developing source simple, flexible plans; planning for likely contingencies; developing standing operating procedures; and fostering initiative among subordinates.
Page 7#uncertainty
One important source of uncertainty is a property known nonlinearity.
…
Minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects.
Page 8#uncertainty
…the acceptance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamble the entire likelihood of success on a single improbable event.
Page 8#uncertainty
…we must view chance not only as a threat but also as an opportunity which we must be ever ready to exploit.
Page 9
Each episode in war is the temporary result of a unique combination of circumstances, presenting a unique set of problems and requiring an original solution.
Nevertheless, no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each episode merges with those that precede and follow it—shaped by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter—creating a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events.
Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought.
Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt—to proactively shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.
Page 10#fluidity
The tempo of war will fluctuate.
…
Darkness and weather can influence the tempo of war but need not to halt it.
Page 10#fluidity
…war gravitates naturally toward disorder.
…
It is precisely this natural disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitation by opportunistic will.
Page 10#disorder
Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly disordered over time. As the situation changes continuously, we are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions have little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme.
Page 10#disorder
The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. We cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events.
The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to influence the general flow of action rather than to try to control each event.
If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly environment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effectively in the face of disorder, we should seek to generate disorder and use it as a weapon against our opponent.
Page 11#disorder
… war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions and incomplete information
Page 12#complexity
Efforts to fully centralize military operations and to exert complete control by a single decisionmaker are inconsistent with the intrinsically complex and distributed nature of war.
Page 13#complexity
Human will, instilled through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.
No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war.
Page 14#humanDimension
Courage is not the absence of fear; rather, it is the strength to overcome fear.
Notes -
This is supported by scientific research in the field of psychology.
Through exposure, a person overcomes fear not because in become less afraid, but because it becomes stronger in the face of that fear.
Page 15#violenceAndDanger
As the hardware of war improves through technological development, so must the tactical, operational, and strategic usage adapt to its improved capabilities both to maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our enemy's.
If we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.
Notes -
A company must always be in touch with recent technological developments and never become a static target. Instead it must see constant renewal at the cost of completely changing technologies and structure if that becomes a need.
When disruptive technology are developed, it must be ready to cannibalize its own business in favor of the disruptive if it wants to survive in the long run.
Page 17#evolutionOfWar
The art of war requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical solution.
Page 18
We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.
Page 19
Boldness is superior to timidity in every instance although boldness does not always equate to immediate aggressive action.
(A nervy, calculating patience that allows the enemy to commit himself irrevocably before we strike him can also be a form of boldness.)
Boldness is based on strong situation awareness: We weigh the situation, then act. In other words, boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.
Notes -
Once proper calculations are made, you must commit 100% to action.
Page 44#boldness
…centers of gravity are any important sources of strength.
…we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist us.
… It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequence to have the desired effect.
Page 46#criticalVulnerabilities
"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect.
Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.
--Hans von Seeckt
Page 51#preparingForWar
Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.
Page 58#professionalism
"Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.
--Sun Tzu
Page 69#conductOfWar
"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.
--Sun Tzu
Page 69#conductOfWar
"Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the Principles of War,' listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement.
'Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad,' he said. There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!"
--Sir William Slim
Page 69#conductOfWar
We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late-until eventually he is overcome by events.
Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as a source of disruption.
We concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and in ways in which it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight.
Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly.
We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which we will direct all available combat power.
When the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.
Page 74#maneuverWarfare
In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative.
Page 75#maneuverWarfare
…subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent.
Notes -
In situations of uncertainty leaders must clearly communicate intent and subordinates must be able to make decisions.
Page 78#philosophyOfCommand
We believe that implicit communication to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other's thoughts is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.
This concept has several practical implications.
First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust.
Second, key people --"actuals"-- should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers.
Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk-our inflections and tone of voice.
Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.
Page 79#philosophyOfCommand
The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomes less a matter of direct influence and more a matter of laying the groundwork for possible future actions.
Page 84#shapingTheAction
If we fail to make a decision out of lack of will, we have willingly surrendered the initiative to our foe.
If we consciously postpone taking action for some reason, that is a decision.
Thus, as a basis for action, any decision is generally better than no decision.
Page 85#decisionmaking
In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage.
…That said, we should also recognize those situations in which time is not a limiting factor-such as deliberate planning situations-and should not rush our decisions unnecessarily.
Page 85#decisionmaking
We must have the moral courage to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty-and to accept full responsibility for those decisions-when the natural inclination would be to postpone the decision pending more complete information.
To delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of moral courage. We do not want to make rash decisions, but we must not squander opportunities while trying to gain more information.
Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonize over one.
The essence of the problem is to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and to do it more quickly than our foe. In this respect, "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."
Page 86#decisionmaking
One key way we put maneuver warfare into practice is through the use of mission tactics.
Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished.
We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the freedom-and establishing the duty for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed necessary based on the situation. Mission tactics relies on a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding.
Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution.
The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination.
The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution only by exception. It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing situation. They inform the commander of what they have done, but they do not wait for permission.
Notes -
Decentralized command:
“In the context of command and control, also called mission command and control. Mission tactics involves the use of mission-type orders.
Mission-type order: Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. —Joint pub 1-02”
You need the right people that will be able to accomplish the job without micromanagement.
They need to be independent, creative, and driven.
From the book Relentless: the most difficult thing for a cleaner to do, is to identify the right people to be surrounded with, that will help him accomplish the job.
Page 87#missionTactics
Mission tactics requires subordinates to act with "topsight"-a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation."
In other words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission
Page 88#missionTactics
There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it.
The intent is thus every mission.
The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the purpose of the action.
The task denotes what is to be done, and sometimes when and where, the intent explains why. Of the two, the intent is predominant.
While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more lasting and continues to guide our actions.
Page 89#commandersIntent
A subordinate should be ever conscious of a senior's intent so that it guides every decision. An intent that is involved or complicated will fail to accomplish this purpose.
Subordinates must have a clear understanding of what their commander expects.
Further, they should understand the intent of the commander at least two levels up.
Page 90#commandersIntent
Another important tool for providing unity is the main effort. Of all the actions going on within our command, we recognize one as the most critical to success at that moment.
The unit assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main effort.
…The main effort receives priority for support of any kind. It becomes clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in the accomplishment of its mission.
… Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: How can I best support the main effort?
Page 91#mainEffort
The main effort involves a physical and moral commitment, although not an irretrievable one.
Page 92#mainEffort
…surfaces are hard spots-enemy strengths-and gaps are soft spots-enemy weaknesses.
…if our main effort has struck a surface but another unit has located a gap, we designate the second unit as the main effort and redirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner, we "pull" combat power through gaps from the front rather than "pushing" it through from the rear."
Commanders must rely on the initiative of subordinates to locate gaps and must have the flexibility to respond quickly to opportunities rather than blindly follow predetermined schemes.
Page 93#surfacesAndGaps
Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism.
Page 96#maneuverWarfare
…There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.
—Winston Churchill
Page 99#theoryOfWar
Mission: "The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor." (Joint Pub 1-02)
Page 106#missionTactics